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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has held that teaching a course in the Science of Creative In-
telligence -Transcendental Meditation in public high schools is an
establishment of religion prohibited by the first amendment.
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
During the 1975-76 school year, five New Jersey school boards of-
fered in their high schools an elective course in the Science of Creative
Intelligence -Transcendental Meditation (SCIITM). The course was
taught by teachers supported by an organization called the World Plan
Executive Council-United States (WPEC-US) using a textbook
authored by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the founder of the Science of
Creative Intelligence.' Students electing the course were required to
attend a "puja" ceremony,' at which they received a Sanskrit sound aid
used in meditation, referred to as a "mantra." During this off campus
ceremony, individually conducted for each student, a Sanskrit invoca-
tion was chanted by the teacher while the student's offerings were
placed on a decorated table in the room." With the completion of the
1. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D.N.J. 1977), affd per curiam, 592 F.2d
197 (3d Cir. 1979).
2. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 198 (3d Cir. 1979). The text described creative in-
telligence, which could be reached through Transcendental Meditation (TM), as the source
of everything in the universe. According to the textbook, of which the district court con-
ducted an exhaustive analysis, every quality we can conceive is in creative intelligence.
440 F. Supp. at 1290. It " 'structures the blueprint of life in our genes .. .regulates the
movement of the far distant galaxies and inspires a musician to give expression to the
fullness of life.' " Id. at 1293 (quoting from the SCI-TM textbook). By regular contact with
creative intelligence through TM one develops a natural ability to know right from
wrong, and one's mind becomes saturated with all the qualities of creative intelligence:
stability, kindness, beauty, independence, decisiveness, happiness, courage, love, justice,
purity, etc. Id. at 1290-91. Creative intelligence is omnipotent, omnipresent and eternal.
Id. at 1294. Synonyms used in the text for creative intelligence include pure intelligence,
bliss-consciousness, perfection of existence, and Brahman or God consciousness. Id. at
1295.
3. 592 F.2d at 198. The "puja" ceremony was held only once for each student, on a
Sunday and off school premises. The "mantra" received at this ceremony was never to be
revealed.
4. Id. Each student was to bring a white handkerchief, flowers and fruit. These of-
ferings were placed on a brass tray before a color picture of Guru Dev, the deceased
teacher of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, while the invocation was chanted. 440 F. Supp. at
1305. The chant, translated by Yogi, was labeled an invocation. It instructs the listener to
bow down; uses the words Lord, emancipator of the world, and redeemer; invokes the
Hindu gods Vishnu, Shiva and Brahma; and attributes to Guru Dev qualities similar to
those attributed to creative intelligence in the textbook. Id. 1306-08. Thus, the chant is in-
voking the spirit or deity of Guru Dev. d. at 1309.
Duquesne Law Review
ceremony each student was taken to a quiet place to meditate using
his newly acquired mantra.'
A coalition of plaintiffs' brought an action in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey to enjoin the teaching of
the course because it violated the establishment clauses of both the
United States Constitution" and the New Jersey Constitution.8 Relying
solely on defendants' depositions, affidavits, the textbook, and the puja
ceremony, plaintiffs moved for and were granted a partial summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The district court held that SCIITM was a proscribed religious
activity for the purpose of the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment.' Several defendants involved in the WPEC-US 1 appealed, con-
tending that the district court erred in determining that teaching
SCI/TM in the public schools constituted an establishment of religion."
In a per curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed, 2 agreeing with the district court's conclusion
that SCIITM was a religious activity for purposes of the establishment
clause, and that teaching SCIITM in public high schools was therefore
prohibited by the first amendment.
In its per curiam opinion the court of appeals also agreed with the
district court's determination that when courts are faced with forms of
religion unknown in prior decisional law, they must look to the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the first amendment's religion
clauses for guidance as to the substantive characteristics which have
previously been found to constitute religion." In providing such
guidance, relatively recent Supreme Court interpretations have char-
acterized as religious the mere affirmation of a belief in a supreme being,"
5. 440 F. Supp. at 1305.
6. Plaintiffs consisted of several taxpayers, parents of high school students,
students, a clergyman, and several non-profit organizations. Id. at 1287.
7. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . U. S. CONST.
amend. I.
8. The New Jersey Constitution provides that "[t]here shall be no establishment of
one religious sect in preference to another . N. J. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
9. 440 F. Supp. at 1327.
10. Defendant school boards, local and state, and defendant public officials did not
join in this appeal. 592 F.2d at 197. Service of process was not effected on defendant
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, a citizen of India. 440 F. Supp. at 1288 n.1. Appellants consisted
of the WPEC-US and three individuals, 592 F.2d at 197, involved in the dissemination and
propagation of the concepts and techniques of SCIITM, 440 F. Supp. at 1287.
11. 592 F.2d at 197-98.
12. Id. at 199.
13. Id.
14. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso the Supreme Court held that
a state law requiring a public official to state his belief in God as a requirement for
holding office, invaded the appointee's freedom of belief and could not be enforced.
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the invocation of a supreme being in a public school,"5 and reading
without comment verses from the Bible." The court rejected ap-
pellants' contention that those prior cases were distinguishable from
the Malnak dispute due to the assertedly non-religious nature of the
SCI/TM course." The court conceded this difference, but viewed the
prior decisions as being relevant in ascertaining the various activities
and beliefs that previously have been viewed as religious.18 After
careful examination of the textbook, the puja ceremony, and expert
testimony," no reversible error was found in the district court's deter-
mination that SCIITM constituted religious activity.'
Because the involvement of government was apparent, the deter-
mination of SCIITM as religious was pivotal to the decision on appeal.2
To measure government involvement in the establishment of a reli-
gion, the court of appeals examined the three-pronged test established
by the Supreme Court in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.'
To be sustained under this test, it is necessary that the government
activity reflects a clearly secular purpose and effect, has a primary im-
15. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1963). In Engel the Court held that the state was
violating the establishment clause by requiring that a non-denominational prayer be
recited at the beginning of each school day.
16. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court held that reading verses
from the Bible and reciting the Lord's Prayer in public schools were violative of the
establishment clause.
17. 592 F.2d at 199. Defendants urged the district court to adopt an approach to the
definition of religion which would be both "substantive and contextual." 440 F. Supp. at
1315-16. Although the courts generally do examine the content as well as the context of
an activity challenged under the first amendment, they do so objectively and not subjec-
tively, as proposed by defendants. Id. at 1316-18. Defendants contended that their deter-
mination of SCI/TM as scientific rather than religious should have been controlling, since
the information and techniques involved were presented in a scientific context. Id. at
1297-1302, 1317-18.
18. 592 F.2d at 199.
19. Id. at 199 nn. 1 & 2. The district court, to effect an exhaustive examination of the
substance of SCI/TM, looked first at the text used in teaching the course. See 440 F.
Supp. at 1289-97. The purpose of TM is to reach the field of creative intelligence, and the
purpose of the text is to explain the characteristics of creative intelligence. See note 2
supra. Ultimately the court decided that the text was describing some essence known
almost universally as "god." 440 F. Supp. at 1320. An equally extensive analysis of the pu-
ja, focusing on the invocation chanted before the icon of Guru Dev and the invocation's
strong resemblance to prayer, produced even further evidence that SCIITM was religious
in nature. See id. at 1305-09. Finally, the depositions and affidavits of the defendants
presented the lower court with information that the predecessor organization to WPEC-
US was incorporated in California as a religious corporation known as the Spiritual
Regeneration Movement Foundation. Id. at 1319.
20. 440 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
21. 592 F.2d at 199.
22. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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pact which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and avoids excessive
entanglements with religion." Applying that test to the teaching of
SCIITM in public schools, the MaInak court concluded that the activity
had as a primary impact the advancement of a religion and religious
concepts," and that state and federal financial aid coupled with use of
public school facilities constituted excessive government en-
tanglements with religion.n Finally, the court considered and rejected
appellants' contention that to be unconstitutional the religious impact
or effect must be substantial," and that even if the SCIITM course was
clearly religious, its effect was neither significant nor substantial. The
court found the authority cited by appellants unpersuasive because of
the factual differences between a brief religious interlude during a
public high school commencement exercise and the teaching of ScI/TM,
which included ceremonial student offerings to deities in the regularly
scheduled curriculum."
Judge Adams, in a concurring opinion, was convinced that the ap-
peal presented a novel and important question that could not be
disposed of simply on the basis of past precedent." He viewed the deci-
sion as based on more than the traditional theistic definition of
religion," the school prayer cases,' and the conscientious objector-free
exercise cases.81 The decision resulted from a still evolving constitu-
tional definition of religion.82 Judge Adams saw this appellate decision
23. Id. at 773.
24. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
25. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. The cases upon which appellants relied were ones in which the constitutionality
of religious invocations and benedictions at high school graduation ceremonies had been
upheld because their effect was viewed as de minimus. See, e.g., Grossberg v. Deusebio,
380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist., 434 F.
Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Weist v. Mt. Lebanon School Dist., 457 Pa. 166, 320 A.2d 362
(1974). Appellants advanced these arguments in support of the proposition that the
religious effect must be substantial to be unconstitutional.
27. 592 F.2d at 200.
28. Id. at 200 (Adams, J., concurring).
29. This definition is rooted in the principles held by the authors of the Constitution,
whose concepts of religion involved man's relationship with a supreme being. See Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1947).
30. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
31. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965).
32. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969), ceri. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); Washington
Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fellowship of Humanity
v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
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as the first to apply the more expansive reading of religion, which had
been developing in the free exercise cases, to an establishment clause
issue; and the first to conclude that a belief constituted a religion over
the protestations of those espousing the belief.u Since the facts in
Malnak went beyond existing case law, Judge Adams felt that the
court's ruling required a more extensive explanation and justification."
Judge Adams first noted that the traditional theistic definition of
religion, exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v.
Beason," was not applicable to the Mahnak situation because there was
no consideration of a supreme being in SCI/TM." He was also uncon-
vinced that the cases involving prayers in public schools," were ap-
plicable to the Malnak situation." Unlike the prayers at issue in those
cases, the Sanskrit chant was completely unintelligible to the students,
and the puja ceremony was never held on school grounds nor during
school hours.8 ' Moreover, the SCI/TM course was completely voluntary
because it was an elective course.8 ' As a result of these distinctions
and because of the theistic nature of the activity involved in the school
prayer decisions, it followed that they were not directly relevant to a
consideration of the SCIITM course."
Judge Adams also examined the analysis undertaken by the
Supreme Court in the conscientious objector decisions of Welsh v.
United States" and United States v. Seeger." He read these decisions,
in which the Court had given a very broad meaning to the religious ex-
emption from selective service provided in section 6(j) of the Universal
33. 592 F.2d at 200 (Adams, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 201 (Adams, J., concurring).
35. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). In this case the Court defined "religion" as referring to "one's
views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for
his being and character, and of obedience to his will." Id. at 342.
36. 592 F.2d at 201 (Adams, J., concurring).
37. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); note 16 supra. See also Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); note 15 supra.
38. 592 F.2d at 201 (Adams, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 203. However, compare this argument with the Roman Catholic Mass which
until recently was said in Latin. It too was unintelligible to many of its participants, yet
its status as "prayer" could not be disputed.
40. Both Engel and Schempp involved activities performed in the classroom;
although the daily Bible readings and invocations were voluntary in the sense that any
student was free to leave during the activity, the Supreme Court implied that the social
stigma that could attach to a child's requesting permission to leave could make the activi-
ty involuntary. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 228; Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. Judge Adams con-
trasted this with the SCI/TM course which was entirely voluntary since it was an elective
course. 592 F.2d at 203.
41. 592 F.2d at 203 (Adams, J., concurring).
42. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
43. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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Military Service and Training Act," as indicative of the Court's will-
ingness to define religion as encompassing more than the traditional
system of theistic beliefs.'5
The fourth line of cases examined by Judge Adams dealt directly
with constitutional challenges to questionable religious activity. The
only Supreme Court case among them, Torcaso v. Watkins," involved a
provision in the Maryland Constitution that required a public official to
declare a belief in God as a requisite for holding state office. By strik-
ing down the law, the Court held that government may not favor
religions based on theism as opposed to those based on different
beliefs."? The decision in Torcaso, and the decisions of lower federal
courts which applied the Torcaso rationale," indicated to Judge Adams
that for .the purposes of the establishment clause, religion was not
restricted to the theistic definition previously applied in the early
Supreme Court decisions.'"
All that remained was to formulate a meaningful definition of
religion that would serve to effectuate what Judge Adams perceived to
be the fundamental intent of the establishment clause-the creation of
a governmental obligation to protect, but never to espouse, the in-
tensely personal response to the imponderable questions about the
44. 65 Stat. 83 (1951) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456 (1976)). The act provides
that "[n]othing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who,
by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form." 50 U.S.C. app. § 456- (1976).
45. 592 F.2d at 204 (Adams, J., concurring).
46. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
47. Id. at 495. In an instructive footnote, the Torcaso Court listed Buddhism and
Taoism, recognized Eastern religions, and Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism as ex-
amples of nontheistic religions. Id. at 495 n.11. Therefore, through dictum the Court was
progressing from its prior reliance on a "supreme being" definition of religion. 592 F.2d at
206 (Adams, J., concurring).
48. Other cases which applied the Torcaso rationale to determine tax exempt status
for religious groups by not confining "religion" to a theistic definition include: Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969)
(Scientology claims kinship with Buddhism and Hinduism and claims benefits to the ill-
nesses of the body by improving the spiritual condition of man); Washington Ethical Soc'y
v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (the Ethical Movement, through Sun-
day services and the ministerial duties of its "Leaders," presents a way of life to form the
moral and spiritual qualities of its members without professing a belief in a supreme be-
ing); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394
(1957) (Secular Humanism, via regularly scheduled Sunday meetings which included
meditation, song and Bible readings, nurtured the study of human relationships, without
professing a belief in a supreme being). The foregoing belief systems were found to be
religious primarily because of their organizational similarity to the structure of traditional
American church groups. 592 F.2d at 206 (Adams, J., concurring).
49. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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meaning of life and death, one's place in the universe, or the proper
moral code of right and wrong.5 To facilitate the formulation of that
definition he presented three indicia that appear basic to traditional
religions. The most important of the three was the "ultimate" nature
of the ideas presented, 5 a concept developed by Protestant theologian
Dr. Paul Tillich and adopted by the Supreme Court in its decision in
Seeger." The second of the three indicia was the comprehensiveness of
the belief system. Judge Adams posited that before a system of beliefs
can be viewed as a religion, it must be broad, pervasive and rule as
truth." The third was the presence of external trappings- services,
clergy, ceremonies, organization and methods of propagation-which
are helpful in the analysis but whose absence is not determinative."
Before applying these flexible guidelines to SCI/TM, Judge Adams
examined the definitional dilemma facing the first amendment's
religion clauses. Historically the broader definition had been adopted
exclusively in free exercise cases.5 Appellants urged adoption of a less
expansive definition of religion because the broader scope definition
was inappropriate in an establishment clause challenge." Judge
Adams, however, felt the stronger argument was to use a single defini-
tion of religion." He reiterated Justice Rutledge's powerful dissent in
Everson v. Board of Education" in which Rutledge presented his views
50. 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring).
51. Id. The term "ultimate" concern as used by Dr. Tillich is analogous to God
without a name, or the power of being. United States v. Seeger, 330 U.S. 163, 180 (1965)
(quoting P. TILLICH, II SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957)). If the word "God" has no meaning
"translate it, and speak to the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your
ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservations." United States v.
Seeger, 330 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (quoting P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57
(1948)). Judge Adams interpreted Tillich as perceiving religion as intimately connected to
concepts of great depth and of utmost importance. Consequently, the "ultimate" nature of
the concepts should be the best evidence that they be treated as religious. 592 F.2d at 208
(Adams, J., concurring).
52. United States v. Seeger, 330 U.S. 163, 180, 187 (1965).
53. 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, J., concurring).
54. Id. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 330
U.S. 163 (1965).
55. 592 F.2d at 210 (Adams, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. See Note, Transcendental Meditation and the Meaning of Religion Under the
Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REV. 877, 904 n.67 (1978) [hereinafter cited Trans-
cendental Meditation]; Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guarantee, 80
YALE L.J. 77, 84 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Toward a Uniform Valuation]. Contra,
Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIs. L. REV.
217, 265-68 [hereinafter cited as Galanter]; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1083-86 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Toward a Constitu-
tional Definition].
58. 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947).
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in support of a unitary definition." Judge Adams adopted this precept
reasoning that if a Roman Catholic is denied government aid, so too
should a Transcendental Meditator, if both are to receive the protec-
tion of the free exercise clause." He concluded that by endorsing the
unitary definition, the broad concepts developed in the free exercise
cases may legitimately be applied to an establishment clause question.
Guided by these indicia, Judge Adams applied a broad "definition by
analogy" to ascertain the religiosity of SCI/TM. From the textbook ex-
planation of creative intelligence,6 it seemed clear to him that the con-
cepts discussed were "ultimate" in nature, as well as comprehensive,
pervasive, and all inclusive. Although the traditional religious trap-
pings of clergy, and marriage and burial rites were absent, sufficient
analogy could be drawn on the basis of propagation, organization, and
ceremony.2 Since those who espoused these views would certainly be
given free exercise protection, they were similarly subject to the
restrictions of the establishment clause.2 Though not theistic, SCI/TM
was a constitutionally protected religion. From this conclusion, it
followed that teaching the course in the New Jersey public schools con-
stituted an impermissible establishment of religion under the prin-
ciples enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nyquist.14
The Malnak decision exemplifies many of the progressive principles
with which federal courts have begun to approach conflicts arising
59. 592 F.2d at 211. Justice Rutledge had argued as follows:
"Religion" appears only once in the amendment. But the word governs two prohibi-
tions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow to forbid
"an establishment" and another, much broader, for securing "the free exercise
thereof." "Thereof" brings down "religion" with its entire and exact content, no
more and no less, from the first into the second guaranty, so that Congress and
now the states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regarding
the other.
330 U.S. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
60. 592 F.2d at 213 (Adams, J., concurring).
61. See note 2 supra.
62. The SCI/TM teachers were trained and supported by the World Plan Executive
Council, not by the New Jersey school districts. 592 F.2d at 215 n.60. The original
organization, the Spiritual Regeneration Movement Foundation, had propagation as its
purpose. See 440 F. Supp. at 1319-20. For a discussion of the puja as a ceremony, see note
4 supra.
63. 592 F.2d at 214 (Adams, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 214-15 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams rejected the district court's
finding that there was a secular purpose of sorts, that some "good" would come from
teaching the course. Indicating that some "good" could also come from instructions in the
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish or Islamic faiths, he asserted that education which is "good"
for students does not make out a secular purpose. An examination of the content of the
SCI/TM course revealed nothing more than an effort to propagate TM, SCI, and the views
of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. Id.
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under the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The seeds of those clauses
were formulated in the minds of American colonists, many of whom
had fled their European homelands because of religious persecution,
and who had fresh memories of sovereign supported churches imposing
fines, imprisonment, torture, and even death to those who failed to join
or support such churches. The first amendment guaranteed that this
government would make no laws concerning the establishment of such
a state supported religion. From documents authored by Thomas Jef-
ferson and James Madison prior to the adoption of the first amend-
ment, it is certain that their meaning of religion was limited to a belief
in a supreme being," a definition routinely accepted by the courts as
they determined what sort of government involvement encouraged
such an establishment."
Many of the cases involving the application of the establishment
clause arose in the context of challenges to the use of public funds for
aid to parochial schools or students. 67 In those cases the Court had
broadly defined the establishment clause as precluding government aid
to one or all religions, preference of one religion over another, and tax-
ation in any manner to support any form of religion." This definition of
the standard to be applied under the establishment clause was further
developed in cases dealing with religious activity in the public schools.
65. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947).
66. See Galanter, supra note 57, at 265-66.
67. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that tax subsidized
salary increments for teachers of secular subjects in sectarian schools were prohibited by
the establishment clause); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that a
state's program of lending secular books to public and parochial high school students did
not violate the establishment clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(upholding state program of reimbursement of bus fares to parochial as well as public
school children). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), in which the Court ruled
that granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations did not violate the
establishment clause.
68. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 15-16. The language employed by the
Court in Everson is illustrative of the establishment clause as it was viewed at that time:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion....
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious ac-
tivities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa.
Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 244, 249 (1879)).
1980
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Permitting teachers of religion to conduct classes in public school
facilities was held to be an impermissible establishment of religion, 9 as
were state required readings from the Bible, recitation of the Lord's
Prayer," and recitation of a non-sectarian prayer in public schools.7 1
Since these activities were so obviously religious in nature, the Court
was required merely to examine their presence in government financ-
ed institutions in order to decide the question of their constitutionality
under the establishment clause.
In 1973, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its developing criteria for ex-
amining establishment clause challenges with its decision in Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist.7 1 In that case, which involved a broad
state program designed to financially assist parochial schools and the
parents of parochial school students, the Court reviewed the numerous
establishment clause decisions and enunciated a three-pronged test for
determining whether an activity or government program constituted
an impermissible establishment of religion. To pass the Nyquist test
the law in question must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose,
must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.7 8
While the meaning of "establishment" under the first amendment
was being clarified by the Supreme Court with decisions such as Ny-
quist, the traditional definition of "religion" was being expanded by
the Court through decisions in cases involving the free exercise
clause.7 ' For example, in Reynolds v. United States7 5 the Court upheld
the Mormons' freedom to worship God in their own way, restricting
only their practice of polygamy. This reasoning was extended by the
Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,7 e a case in which the Court struck
down a state statute that restricted the solicitation of money for
religious causes to persons who obtained a certificate from a state of-
ficial." Four years later in United States v. Ballard,8 the Court ruled
69. McCollum v. Board of Educ. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
70. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
71. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
72. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
73. Id. at 772-73. The Court went on to invalidate the provisions of the New York
program which reimbursed in part the tuition paid by parents of parochial school
students, allowed income tax relief to those parents, and gave financial aid to parochial
schools for maintenance and repair. Id. at 798.
74. Transcendental Meditation, supra note 57, at 889, 899 n.48.
75. 98 U.S. 244 (1879).
76. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
77. Id. at 301-03.
78. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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that the founder of the "I Am" movement' could not be precluded
from sending allegedly fraudulent literature through the mails because
the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs contained in the material
was excluded from the consideration of its fraudulent nature."° Finally,
in Torcaso v. Watkins," the Court completely departed from a theistic
definition of "religion" for the purposes of interpreting the free exer-
cise clause, concluding that free exercise protection extended to those
whose religious beliefs did not necessarily include a belief in the tradi-
tional concept of a supreme being."'
Malnak represents the first time that a federal court has found an
activity to be religious despite the contentions of its adherents that it
is not. The approach taken in the Malnak decision, in which the court
compared the substantive characteristics of SCI/TM with activities
considered to be religious in prior Supreme Court decisions,' may in-
dicate an increased acceptability of using, for the purpose of analogy,
free exercise as well as establishment clause decisions. Unfortunately,
just as courts before it had avoided defining "religion," the Malnak
court failed to define that term, even though a definition was essential
to its conclusion that teaching SCIITM in public schools constituted an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. The implications of the very
narrow holding in Malnak are therefore limited to other instances of
teaching SCI/TM in public schools, and will be of little assistance in
establishment clause situations involving an allegedly religious activity
other than SCI/TM.
In arriving at the conclusion that ScI/TM was a religious activity,
both the per curiam and concurring opinions drew freely from deci-
sions dealing tangentially with religion.' Some or all of the guidelines
enunciated in those decisions have been used in evaluating free exer-
cise claims, but the question left unanswered by the Malnak court was
whether they are appropriate in adjudicating claims brought under the
establishment clause. Malnak would have been an appropriate vehicle
in which to address this dilemma, because of the integral relationship
between the free exercise question, which usually involves determining
whether a particular activity or belief is a religion, and the establish-
79. The "I Am" movement would make known to mankind through the divine
messenger, Ballard, the words of the "ascended masters." Ballard believed that he had
talked with Jesus and St. Germain, and that he had the powers to heal diseases, injuries
and ailments. He was charged with using the mails to fraudulently obtain money and pro-
perty from people so afflicted. Id. at 79-80.
80. Id. at 88.
81. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). See note 47 supra.
82. 367 U.S. at 495.
83. 592 F.2d at 199.
84. See id. at 199-200; id at 201-12 (Adams, J., concurring).
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ment question, which usually involves determining whether the
presence of that activity in a public school is constitutional. It must be
noted, however, that a unitary definition of religion for purposes of the
establishment and free exercise clauses is not without opposition. It
has been argued that for the free exercise clause, religion should be
defined broadly in order to protect freedom of conscience for any
beliefs that are arguably religious, but for the establishment clause, a
narrow definition is more appropriate and will protect an arguably non-
religious belief system from unnecessary restrictions. 5 Proponents of
such a "dual definition" have further suggested that to violate the
establishment clause the practice at issue must qualify as a religion
based upon objective community understandings," while free exercise
infringements are based upon a subjective personal perspective . 7
Under these standards, SCI/TM arguably could be entitled to the pro-
tection of the free exercise clause, but could avoid restriction under
the establishment clause."
The unitary definition of religion, on the other hand, is primarily
based upon the language of the first amendment itself.9 Proponents of
the unitary definition refuse to segregate the clauses where identical
issues are at stake, declaring that religion should be defined identically
whether the government is inhibiting it or encouraging it and that on-
ly the goals in applying the definition should differ." Similar to the
dual definition, the examination of a belief under the free exercise
clause is subjective, focusing upon the believer's sincerity and requir-
ing that the belief be held in a position in life parallel to that of an or-
thodox belief. An examination under the establishment clause must be
objective, focusing upon the community standard of whether the belief
is likely to be accepted as religious, rather than upon any present
public understanding of the belief as religious. 1 Under both clauses,
85. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TRIBE]. See also Toward a Constitutional Definition, supra note 57, at 1083.
86. Galanter, supra note 57, at 266-67.
87. Transcendental Meditation supra note 57, at 897-98.
88. TRIBE, supra note 85, at 828-29. Professor Tribe advocates that for the free exer-
cise clause, "religion" must expand beyond theism to include multiplying forms of
legitimate religious exercise, but that the term must be less expansive for the establish-
ment clause "lest all 'humane' programs of government be deemed constitutionally
suspect." Id. at 827-28. Commenting on the district court's holding in Malnak, Tribe
argues that "[s]ince TM is arguably non-religious, it should not be considered a religion
when an establishment question is raised." Id. at 828-29. He also describes what seems to
be a narrower definition used by the Supreme Court in establishment clause decisions
than in decisions involving free exercise claims. Id. at 829. See also Galanter, supra note
57, at 255-58.
89. See note 59 supra.
90. See Toward a Uniform Valuation, supra note 57, at 84.
91. Transcendental Meditation, supra note 57, at 897, 903-04.
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the belief system must be comprehensive, ultimate, and fill a position
to that of more conventional religions in the life of its adherents. In ad-
dition, for an activity or belief to be religious under the establishment
clause, there must be an organized group and religous trappings
associated with the group or activity." Under a free exercise challenge
the court must determine if the believer has actually accepted the
belief system as his religion; however, under the establishment clause
the court must objectively determine if the belief system is likely to
be accepted as religious. 8 Although the Malnak court relied heavily
upon establishment clause precedent in the per curiam opinion, Judge
Adams, by virtue of his concurring opinion, has apparently joined the
trend toward a unitary definition of religion as a guideline for inter-
preting both religion clauses of the first amendment.
Like the Supreme Court establishment clause cases, Malnak
represents a judicial awareness of a need to protect children from
government supported religions in public schools. Although the relax-
ing techniques of Transcendental Meditation are subsidized in many
government areas,9' the social context of the public high schools and
the susceptibility, naivete, and accepting nature of children further in-
crease the likelihood that a student could accept SCI/TM as religious.9
The current visibility in our society of neo-Oriental cults and the ap-
prehension with which they are viewed support the unitary standard
of defining religion in terms of the likelihood of its acceptance.
Moreover, prohibiting government preference of one religion over
another advances religious Darwinism-the survival of the fittest as
applied to religion." Traditionally, religions have been maintained in
our nation solely by voluntary means. 7 To decide that government is
precluded by the establishment clause from aiding SCIITM, both
directly through tax dollars and indirectly through the use of public
high school facilities, further clarifies the criteria necessary to main-
tain the constitutional goal of keeping church and state separate.
Jennifer Fox Rabold
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